Profits From Buying Losers And Selling Winners In The London Stock Exchange by Antoniou, Antonios et al.
Journal Of Business & Economics Research  Volume 1, Number 11 
 59 
Profits From Buying Losers And Selling 
Winners In The London Stock Exchange 
Antonios Antoniou (E-mail: antonios.antoniou@Durham.ac.ak), University of Durham, UK 
Emilios C. Galariotis (E-mail: emilios.galariotis@dirham.ac.uk), University of Durham, UK 
Spyros I. Spyrou (E-mail: sis@hol.gr), Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece 
 
 
Abstract 
 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) have challenged the notions of market efficiency and of rational 
investor behaviour. According to their findings stock portfolios that experience negative returns 
tend to outperform portfolios that experience positive returns, during the subsequent period. In 
other words, stock returns may be predictable, and this may be due to excessive investor optimism 
and pessimism. This paper investigates the existence of such contrarian profits for stocks listed in 
the London Stock Exchange. The results indicate that contrarian strategies are profitable for UK 
stocks and more pronounced for extreme market capitalisation stocks. These profits persist even 
after the sample is adjusted for market frictions, and irrespective of whether raw or risk-adjusted 
returns are used. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) challenge the notions of market efficiency and of rational investor behaviour 
by demonstrating that portfolios that experience negative returns tend to outperform ones that experience positive 
returns, by up to 25% during the subsequent period. They suggest that the observed predictability is due to negative 
serial correlation and stems from extreme investor optimism and pessimism.  
 
This paper investigates the existence of such contrarian profits for stocks listed in the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE henceforth) a leading global equity market. There are three main issues that differentiate this paper 
from previous UK empirical studies. Firstly, it considers short-term contrarian strategies, since investors tend to 
have short investment horizons and are unlikely to set up very long-term strategies. Secondly, it considers risk-
adjustments based on three-factor models rather than adjustments that only consider a single (market) factor. 
Thirdly, it investigates whether the results are affected by market microstructure biases, such as bid ask bias and 
infrequent trading. 
 
The paper is organised as follows: in the following two sections we briefly review some of the most 
important studies in the empirical literature and present the sample data. Next, we test for serial correlation since 
negative serial correlation can transform winners to losers and losers to winners. In other words, if negative serial 
correlation is present in the data a strategy that shorts each period past winners and longs each period past losers 
could be profitable. Finally, we present the contrarian trading strategies and also examine whether the results are due 
to market microstructure biases. 
 
 
2.  A Brief Review of the Literature 
 
In the first study that initiated the debate DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) find that US long-term stock 
returns are predictable. That is, portfolios that experience negative returns tend to outperform portfolios that 
experience positive return, by up to 25% during the subsequent period. In following studies on US stocks, Jegadeesh 
(1990), Jegadesh & Titman (1995), Lehman (1990) produce results that tend to indicate that this may also be the 
case for short-term contrarian strategies. A first possible explanation of the effect was put forward by Chan (1988) 
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and Ball and Kothari (1989) who argued that this phenomenon is due to risk miss measurement and changes in 
equilibrium required returns. Zarowin (1990) offers another possible explanation arguing that losers have a tendency 
to be smaller sized firms than winners, in the US market. Still other authors argue that the explanation lies in market 
frictions such as bid-ask biases and infrequent trading which are not properly accounted (e.g. Conrad and Kaul, 
1993). Lo and MacKinlay (1990) point out that these strategies may be profitable even when the returns of some 
stocks react faster to information than the returns of other stocks (a lead-lag effect). However, Jegadesh and Titman 
(1995) find that despite the presence of a size-related lead-lag structure most of contrarian profits are due to firm-
specific overreaction. 
 
In empirical studies that involve long-term UK market evidence Poterba and Summers (1988) find negative 
serial correlation consistent with overreaction, while Dissanaike (1997) employs contrarian strategies adjusted for 
risk and also finds that past losers outperform past winners. Furthermore, Brouwer et al., (1997) come to similar 
conclusions, Richards (1997) shows that overreaction is unrelated to risk and anomalies, and Balvers et al., (1999) 
confirm mean reversion and overreaction. Finally, Baytas and Cakiki (1999) find positive and significant profits for 
contrarian portfolios, and Clare and Thomas (1995) find long-term evidence that seem to be consistent with 
overreaction. They argue however that the results are related to the size-effect.  
 
 
3.  Data  
 
The paper uses weekly price observations for all stocks listed on the LSE that had at least 260 consecutive 
observations, between 1984 and 2000. The FTSE100 Price Index is employed as a proxy for the common factor 
(market portfolio). Returns are continuously compounded, defined as the first difference of the logarithmic price 
levels, and all data are collected from Datastream International. Table 1 presents statistics on the number of firms 
available for each year and their market values. For example, the largest number of firms (1645) in a single year are 
for 1990, while the smallest one is met in 1985 (1164 firms). The smallest market value of a firm is below 0.01 
million Sterling for years 1989 through 1996, while the maximum market value is for year 2000 (119,814.1 million 
sterling). Mean market values range from 255.2 million in 1985 to 1,234.6 million in 2000.  
 
 
Table 1 
Total Number of Firms in the Sample and Market Values per year 
 
Year 
 
Min. 
Value 
Max. 
Value 
Mean 
Value 
Total no. 
of firms  
1985 0.03 63908.49 255.1624 1164 
1986 0.03 66349.63 270.0225 1247 
1987 0.04 50232.23 316.029 1351 
1988 0.04 37661.02 310.5211 1460 
1989 <0.01 40510.89 310.9541 1569 
1990 <0.01 42404.25 376.6412 1645 
1991 <0.01 34655.77 313.3649 1607 
1992 <0.01 26962 373.1171 1542 
1993 <0.01 24963.15 455.0192 1502 
1994 <0.01 30041.87 568.5602 1521 
1995 <0.01 28257.65 525.9799 1559 
1996 <0.01 65188.08 640.5103 1588 
1997 0.04 39147.56 640.5264 1520 
1998 0.04 51451.2 795.1016 1446 
1999 0.04 74902.88 882.729 1340 
2000 0.35 119814.1 1234.571 1195 
Note: Values in million of Sterling. 
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For the empirical analysis, stocks are assigned to five sub-samples based on market capitalisation (i.e. 
smallest, small, medium, large, largest firm sub-samples) as follows: every year all stocks are ranked based on the 
previous year-end stock market capitalisation and subsequently grouped to five sub-samples that each contain 20% 
of firms. The procedure is repeated every year, for a period of sixteen years.  
 
Descriptive return statistics based on closing prices are presented in Table 2. The average weekly return for 
all stocks is 0.05% with a standard error of 0.017, while the highest mean return is that of the smallest stock sub-
sample (0.001). The largest stock sub-sample has the second highest return and the highest standard error (0.020).  
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Stock Returns  
 
 All Stocks Smallest 
Stocks 
Small 
Stocks 
Medium 
Stocks 
Large Stocks Largest Stocks 
Mean 0.00050 0.00101 -0.00003 -0.00002 0.00048 0.00089 
Standard Error 0.01662 0.01784 0.01697 0.01697 0.01796 0.01973 
Minimum -0.16978 -0.14958 -0.17176 -0.16546 -0.17956 -0.18397 
Maximum 0.06778 0.07827 0.08295 0.07557 0.09478 0.10306 
Jarque-Berra 15149.6 7048.275 12268.07 9956.03042 11318.997 12772.641 
 
 
4.  Negative Serial Correlation 
 
An important issue in the examination of the predictability of stock returns and profits from contrarian 
strategies is the existence of negative serial correlation in stock returns. That is, negative serial correlation can 
transform winners to losers and losers to winners, in other words, a strategy that shorts each period past winners and 
longs each period past losers could be profitable.  Thus, as a first step in the analysis, this paper investigates whether 
negative serial correlation is present in the data.  
 
However, since authors have pointed out that how one defines abnormal returns is important for the 
profitability of contrarian strategies (see for example Chopra et al., 1992), the paper does not only examine simple 
raw returns but also returns adjusted for risk. We do this in two ways: (a) with a single factor model as is done in 
most previous studies and (b) with a three-factor model similar to the one suggested by Fama and French (1996).  
 
More specifically, returns are first defined as the residuals (ei,t) from a market model as follows:  
 
titmiiit erbar ,,   (1) 
 
where ri,t is the raw return of stock i at time t, rm,t is the return of the market portfolio (m) at time t, and ei,t is the 
market-adjusted return for stock i at time t.  
 
Next, returns are defined as the residuals (ei,t) from a three-factor model as follows: 
 
titHMLtSMBtmmiit eHMLbSMBbrbar ,,   (2) 
 
In (2) the factor SMB (Small Minus Big) is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks 
and the return on a portfolio of large stocks. The factor HML (High Minus Low) is the difference between the return 
on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. The factors 
are constructed in a similar manner as in Fama and French, 1996.  
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The results are presented in Table 3, and suggest that negative serial correlation is present in the data. With 
raw returns (Panel A) 453 of the sample firms exhibit negative 1
st
 order serial correlation. When market risk is 
considered (Panel B), 643 firms exhibit 1
st
 order negative serial correlation, while when returns are adjusted for 
factors similar to the FF ones, 739 firms exhibit 1
st
 order serial correlation. Put simply, in the last case more than 
half of the firms in the sample are negatively serially correlated in the 1
st
 order, and this could indicate that past 
losers are less risky than past winners. In order to examine whether firms that trade infrequently affect the above 
results we also test for serial correlation in the data after excluding all stocks that trade infrequently. The results are 
similar to the results presented in Table 3, and are not reported here (but are available upon request). To summarise 
the results thus far, negative correlation appears present in UK stock returns even after adjusting for various risk 
factors, in line with long term evidence by Balvers et al., (1999), and Poterba and Summers (1988). 
 
 
Table 3 
Serial Correlation & Significance (All Firms) 
 
Order 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
 
Panel A: Raw Returns  
Number of Stocks 
5% 
453 
119* 
621 
219* 
918 
424* 
980 
491* 
 
Panel B: Risk-Adjusted Returns  
Number of Stocks 
5% 
643 
200* 
813 
298* 
1018 
435* 
977 
430* 
 
Panel C: Three-factor adjusted Returns  
Number of Stocks 
5% 
739 
239* 
962 
348* 
1144 
480* 
1042 
407* 
Notes: 
* Denotes firms with significant negative serial correlation at the 5% level  
Table 3 presents stocks with negative serial correlation 
 
 
5.  The Trading Strategy 
 
As shown above stock returns in the LSE exhibit negative serial correlation. This could potentially create 
profits for a trading strategy that buys past losers and sells past winners. The trading strategy employed in this paper 
is a standard short-term contrarian strategy, i.e. it consists of a portfolio that every period is short in the previous 
period’s winners and long in the previous period’s losers. The strategy is also employed in previous studies such as 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1995), Lo and Mackinley (1990), among others. More specifically, the zero-investment 
portfolios are re-balanced every week, and the profits t, are estimated as: 
 
tit
N
i
tit rrr
N
,1
1
1, )(
1


    (3) 
 
where, 1tr  is the lagged return on an equally weighted portfolio that contains all stocks, ri,t-1 is the return on stock i 
at time t-1, and N is the number of stocks in the sample.  
 
However, as discussed above, many authors have argued that contrarian profits may be due to biases such 
as bid-ask biases or infrequent trading. In order to examine whether any observed profits are due to market frictions 
we also recalculate contrarian profits employing bid-to-bid prices rather than closing prices, and also we recalculate 
profits after excluding infrequently trading firms. The results are reported in Table 4 for all size sub-samples and the 
full sample. In Panel A, we report the average contrarian profit for all sub-samples when closing prices are used to 
compute returns. In Panel B, we report profits when bid-to-bid prices are employed, while in Panel C we report 
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profits when infrequently trading firms are excluded. Panel D and E report profits for risk adjusted returns when 
infrequently trading firms are excluded. Risk adjustment takes place by means of a single factor model (Panel D) 
and a three-factor model (Panel E), as discussed above. 
 
As can be seen from Table 4 (Panel A) contrarian profits are statistically significant for the smallest, large, 
and largest sub-sample. For example, the average weekly contrarian profit (x103) is 0.156 and 0.338 for the 
smallest and the largest sub-sample respectively. Note that, Jegadeesh and Titman, for the US market find higher 
average weekly contrarian profits and also while in the US contrarian profits decline as one moves from small to 
large stocks, the opposite seems to happen in the LSE. The profits with the bid-to-bid prices (Panel B) appear lower, 
thus, it appears that a bid-ask bias may affect results. For example, the average weekly profit for the all stock-group 
is 0.029 from 0.076 and statistically insignificant. When infrequently trading firms are excluded (Panel C) average 
weekly profits also appear lower. For example, the average weekly contrarian profit for largest stocks is now 0.101 
from 0.338 in Panel A, while for smallest stocks it is 0.081 from 0.156. The results so far seem to suggest that part 
of the profits may be due to infrequent trading and also that contrarian strategies are profitable only for the two 
extreme size sub-samples.  
 
The average weekly contrarian profits that are obtained from risk adjusted returns (Panels E and D) exhibit 
a different picture. Firstly, profits are positive and statistically and significant at the 5% level for nearly all sub-
samples. Secondly profits decline as one moves from smallest to large stock sub-samples (similar to the results of 
previous studies for the US market.  
 
 
Table 4 
Contrarian Profits (π)   
 
 All 
Stocks 
Smallest 
Stocks 
Small  
Stocks 
Medium 
Stocks 
Large 
Stocks 
Largest 
Stocks 
 
Panel A: Closing prices (all stocks) 
 
π x 103 0.07625 
(2.320)* 
0.15630 
(2.753)* 
-0.01585 
(-0.749) 
0.03611 
(0.426) 
-0.06839 
(-4.480)* 
0.33848 
(2.495)* 
 
Panel B: Bid-to-Bid Prices 
 
π x 103 
 
0.02886 
(1.046) 
0.05741 
(1.032) 
0.07459 
(0.613) 
-0.09078 
(-5.255)* 
-0.04829 
(-3.323)* 
0.09572 
(5.556)* 
 
Panel C: Excluding Stocks that Trade Infrequently  
 
π x 103 -0.00127 
(-0.101) 
0.08120 
(1.953)** 
-0.03391 
(-1.528) 
-0.04713 
(-2.143)* 
-0.06867 
(-5.138)* 
0.10132 
(7.056)* 
 
Panel D: Single-Factor Risk-Adjusted Returns (Frequent Trading Stocks) 
 
π x 103 0.00243 
(0.197) 
0.21672 
(5.185)* 
0.060575 
(2.995)* 
0.03346 
(1.703)** 
-0.00404 
(-0.263) 
0.11950 
(8.537)* 
 
Panel E: Three-factor Risk-Adjusted Returns (Frequent Trading Stocks) 
 
π x 103 0.01777 
(1.647)** 
0.25554 
(6.097)* 
0.09693 
(4.874)* 
0.058466 
(3.109)* 
0.028521 
(1.997)* 
0.12992 
(10.369)* 
Note: 
t-statistics appear in parentheses 
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In order to examine the economic significance of these contrarian profits, the contrarian profit per Sterling 
long (Ψ) are estimated as follows as suggested by Bacmann and Dubois 1998. More specifically the contrarian profit 
per Sterling long (Ψ) is:  
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1,1,   tmti rr  or 0 otherwise. Ψ is defined to provide profits only when each asset’s 
lagged returns are lower than the lagged average returns of all stocks in the sample, in which case the position on 
that asset next period would be long. Obtaining a weighted average of returns (Ψ) results to returns per Sterling 
long. The results for contrarian profits per Sterling long are reported in Table 5 (organised exactly as Table 4) and 
suggest that contrarian profits are positive and economically significant for most sub-samples only when returns are 
adjusted for risk. For example, when a three-factor model is used to adjust for risk the contrarian profit per Euro 
long for the smallest stock sub-sample is 0.00567 with a significant t-statistic of 5.094. The contrarian profit per 
Euro long for the largest stock sub-sample is 0.00368 with a significant t-statistic of 7.938. 
 
 
Table 5 
Contrarian Profits Per Euro Long (Ψ)  
 
 All 
Stocks 
Smallest 
Stocks 
Small Stocks Medium 
Stocks 
Large 
Stocks 
Largest 
Stocks 
 
Panel A: Closing prices (all stocks) 
 
 
Ψ 
0.00221 
(1.561) 
0.00704 
(3.366)* 
-0.00014 
(-0.121) 
-0.00294 
(-2.690)* 
-0.00285 
(-2.675)* 
0.00487 
(1.429) 
 
Panel B: Bid-to-Bid Prices 
 
 
Ψ 
0.00201 
(0.908) 
0.00168 
(1.063) 
0.00394 
(0.699) 
-0.00474 
(-4.032)* 
-0.00213  
(-1.860)** 
0.00357 
(3.035)* 
 
Panel C: Excluding Stocks that Trade Infrequently  
 
 
Ψ 
0.00052 
(0.574) 
0.003325 
(2.265)* 
-0.00117 
(-0.977) 
-0.00420 
(-3.502)* 
-0.00210 
(-2.231)* 
0.00315 
(3.656)* 
 
Panel D: Single-Factor Risk-Adjusted Returns (Frequent Trading Stocks) 
 
 
Ψ 
-0.00029 
(-0.448) 
0.00544 
(4.454)* 
0.00289 
(3.169)* 
0.00015 
(0.153) 
0.00005 
(0.084) 
0.00332 
(6.447)* 
 
Panel E: Three-factor Risk-Adjusted Returns (Frequent Trading Stocks) 
 
 
Ψ 
0.00009 
(0.151) 
0.00567 
(5.094)* 
0.00381 
(4.517)* 
0.00086 
(1.007) 
0.00084 
(1.369) 
0.00368 
(7.938)* 
Notes: 
t-statistics appear in parentheses 
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To summarise thus far, contrarian strategies produce statistically (π) and economically (ψ) significant 
profits in the LSE, irrespective of how stock returns are defined. In addition, the two most "profitable" sub-samples 
appear to be the two extreme size sub-samples. Furthermore, profits decline as one moves from the smallest stock 
sub-sample to larger stock sub-samples. The paper’s findings so far on short-term profitability are in line in most 
aspects with studies for the US market, and consistent with long-term findings for the UK stock market (e.g. 
Dissanaike, 1997, Brouwer et al., 1997, etc).  
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper investigates the existence of short-term contrarian profits for stocks listed in the LSE. The main 
result that emerges from the empirical analysis is that contrarian strategies produce statistically and economically 
significant profits that are not explained by infrequent trading, bid-ask biases, and risk. Furthermore, profits are 
more pronounced for extreme market capitalization stocks (smallest - largest), and LSE investors could thus employ 
contrarian strategies for such stocks.  
 
The results presented in the paper seem to suggest that past prices predict future returns, implying that the 
market is not efficient with respect to historical information. This is consistent with previous results for the UK 
market on long-term price reversals. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that short-term contrarian profits are not 
specific for US data.  
 
With respect to market participants, the facts show that contrarian strategies in the LSE are also profitable 
for short-term horizons and more importantly, profits are not due to taking on excess risk directly or indirectly, since 
profits exist for risk adjusted returns of even large and more liquid stocks.  
 
A question that arises at this point is on the factors that drive these profits; i.e. are they firm specific or 
market wide factors, and if both of these sets of factors contribute, to what extent does each one do. It would thus be 
very interesting to examine this issue further. This however, is the work of another working paper by the Antoniou, 
Galariotis and Spyrou (2003).   
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